Quantum Crypto
This page summarizes post-quantum cryptography (PQC) in noxtls, why it matters, and how the current implementation is intended to be used.
Why quantum crypto matters
Large-scale quantum computers are expected to weaken widely used public-key schemes such as RSA and ECC. Even before practical quantum attacks are available, there is a "harvest now, decrypt later" risk for data that must remain confidential for many years.
For this reason, modern TLS and PKI deployments are starting staged migration to PQC-capable algorithms.
Current noxtls PQC scope
noxtls currently includes:
- ML-KEM (FIPS 203) for key encapsulation
- ML-DSA (FIPS 204) for signatures
- TLS 1.3 integration for:
- pure ML-KEM keyshare groups
- hybrid X25519 + ML-KEM groups
- ML-DSA and RSA-ML-DSA signature scheme paths
- X.509 integration for ML-DSA signature verification paths
See API references:
Migration approach
Recommended adoption model:
- Start with hybrid TLS key exchange where compatibility is required.
- Enable PQC in controlled environments and validate interop and performance.
- Keep cryptographic agility in configuration and certificate pipelines.
- Track standards evolution and be ready to update private-use IDs/profiles as final assignments and ecosystem support mature.
Build and feature gates
Enable PQC features with:
cmake -S . -B build \
-DNOXTLS_CFG_FEATURE_ML_KEM=ON \
-DNOXTLS_CFG_FEATURE_ML_DSA=ON
Related docs:
Security notes
- Treat PQC deployment as an evolving interoperability program, not a one-time switch.
- Use strict testing/conformance profiles in CI for PQ-enabled builds.
- Continue applying classical TLS and PKI best practices (certificate validation, key protection, secure defaults) while rolling out PQC.